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ABSTRACT 
 
 With the growth of IT products and sophisticated software in various operating 
systems, I observe that security risks in systems are skyrocketing constantly. 
Consequently, Security Assessment is now considered as one of primary security 
mechanisms to measure assurance of systems since systems that are not compliant with 
security requirements may lead adversaries to access critical information by 
circumventing security practices. In order to ensure security, considerable efforts have 
been spent to develop security regulations by facilitating security best-practices. 
Applying shared security standards to the system is critical to understand vulnerabilities 
and prevent well-known threats from exploiting vulnerabilities. However, many end users 
tend to change configurations of their systems without paying attention to the security. 
Hence, it is not straightforward to protect systems from being changed by unconscious 
users in a timely manner. Detecting the installation of harmful applications is not 
sufficient since attackers may exploit risky software as well as commonly used software. 
In addition, checking the assurance of security configurations periodically is 
disadvantageous in terms of time and cost due to zero-day attacks and the timing attacks 
that can leverage the window between each security checks. Therefore, event-driven 
monitoring approach is critical to continuously assess security of a target system without 
ignoring a particular window between security checks and lessen the burden of exhausted 
task to inspect the entire configurations in the system. Furthermore, the system should be 
able to generate a vulnerability report for any change initiated by a user if such changes 
refer to the requirements in the standards and turn out to be vulnerable. Assessing various 
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systems in distributed environments also requires to consistently applying standards to 
each environment. Such a uniformed consistent assessment is important because the way 
of assessment approach for detecting security vulnerabilities may vary across applications 
and operating systems.  
In this thesis, I introduce an automated event-driven security assessment framework to 
overcome and accommodate the aforementioned issues. I also discuss the implementation 
details that are based on the commercial-off-the-self technologies and testbed being 
established to evaluate approach. Besides, I describe evaluation results that demonstrate 
the effectiveness and practicality of the approaches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
The government, defense, and private sectors have been struggling to keep computer 
systems away from security breaches. Among many useful methods to secure systems, 
Security Assessment has been considered as an effective method to measure assurance of 
systems based on security standards and the status of compliance with baselines [32]. 
Such standards and baselines could help systems avoid well-known risks and describe the 
weakest points of systems by allowing rigorous security analysis and discovering 
configurations that cause potential risks in systems. Furthermore, Security assessment 
enlightens parties to understand security goal precisely, and thus it may mitigate security 
risks and ensure an appropriate level of system assurance. 
US federal government has recognized the importance of security assessment and started 
to develop plans for using Microsoft’s operating system based on specific security 
configurations, which stem from US Air Force’s common security configuration for 
Windows XP. This initiative was expanded to deal with other operating systems such as 
iOS, Linux, and HPX [33][34]. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed Federal Desktop Core 
Configuration (FDCC) baseline for the purpose of security management, which prevents 
security problems as early as possible caused by malfunctioned operating system and 
faulty configurations which have been found by security testers or attackers [33]. The 
United State Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) evolved from FDCC 
replaces the FDCC baseline for Information Technology (IT) products widely deployed 
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across agencies [34].  However, under increasing number of products and various 
operating systems, establishing standards and measuring security risks are getting harder 
to collect and test all of security configuration resources by security analysts. The FDCC 
and USGCB teams decided to work together with organizations and companies for 
collecting vulnerability information with XML-based well-structured format and 
maintain information into one repository to facilitate easy sharing process and 
comprehensive protection. As a result, the XML format of vulnerability information has 
been discussed, analyzed, stored, and disseminated by central place, MITRE Corporation. 
This XML-based specification was named as Open Vulnerability Assessment Language 
(OVAL) for the purpose of a single security standard that is both human- and machine-
readable and covers various operating systems and its applications [20][21].  
The main purpose of both FDCC and USGCB is to develop and implement security 
configuration baselines, and gather security assessment results to provide the current 
status of system assurance to stakeholders. In other words, it allows them to determine 
how much security problems could be occurred in a target system with the help of 
security baselines. However, both departments mainly focus on the detection of 
vulnerabilities in the system. Consequently, Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA) was initiated to prioritize risk-based security assessment and real-time 
continuous monitoring of security controls as a critical focus of compliance and security, 
due to a dramatic increase in security incidents at federal agencies [19]. For example, the 
reported security incidents among 24 key agencies increased more than 650% in the last 
five years but ironically these federal agencies have periodically performed security 
assessment based on security configuration baselines.  
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Therefore, the need of new continuous security monitoring that depends on system 
environments has been recently addressed in the security community. The previous 
monitoring approaches have been mainly dedicated to share security incidents by 
stacking security issues up in the repository as much as possible. By using the gathered 
information, the traditional security monitoring approach periodically measures system 
assurance since it is tedious and costly to evaluate the entire system with various 
standards. However, it is critical to perpetually monitor the previously discovered 
security issues in a target system since it would be worthwhile to detecting new risks. 
Every events in the target system with respect to users’ behavior such as installing 
software packages or patching updates should be considered to perform security 
assessment so that we can achieve a more comprehensive assessment to reflect any 
changes and modifications on the system’s configuration. Thus, the periodic security 
assessment is not sufficient enough to measure the assurance of systems.  
We reiterate that we need event-driven continuous monitoring system is necessary to 
consider the newly changed configuration that may draw security problems on the 
system. Without evaluating system environments reflecting to the system configuration 
that can be frequently changed by users, continuous security assessment is the most 
effective approach to reduce and eliminate potential risks.  In addition, as mentioned 
above, diverse environments and various software applications that change system 
configurations are another obstacle to hinder the accurate assessment of systems. To 
perceive comprehensive security risks is increasingly tough even to security experts 
because it is difficult to understand or define different domains of security problems. We 
thus need a comprehensive and domain-independent approach that can be used in 
 4 
 
multiple environments in a seamless manner. There are many commercial tools to 
discover and share vulnerability information to the public for the purpose of avoiding 
security risks. Without having the integrated data to provide the commonly 
understandable security information to each computer environment, it is also hard to 
measure system assurance comprehensively. In this thesis, we leverage the notion of 
ontology to build a system that can support various environments for performing efficient 
high-level reasoning and making better decision. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
There are several questions that this thesis attempts to address. First, Security 
Assessment (SA) is crucial part of measuring assurance status of systems, but most SA 
techniques have been focused mostly on how to define and detect vulnerability or 
vulnerable configurations with the periodic system check. Security administrator 
performs security assessment periodically because it is obligated to comply with the 
security standards and it helps discover inappropriate configurations in the system and the 
potential issues that can be missed without deep inspection of the system. So, it might be 
enough to realize current system status but the drawback of periodic security 
measurement is that configurations could be changed any time by users. Event-driven 
security assessment is strongly demanded because of this reason. For example, suppose a 
security administrator sets the security measurement task up for twenty-four hours and a 
user changes one of system configurations an hour after the measurement was performed. 
If the changed configuration meets the conditions of vulnerable configurations, then 
attackers can still have twenty-three hours to use this security configuration breach for 
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their malicious purpose. By this reason, event-driven continuous monitoring should be 
carried out. 
Second, applying proper security standards corresponding to each system helps systems 
keep safe. Many companies and organizations generate and provide OVAL-based 
security assessment practices to the public. Many standards with various approaches help 
understand a wide-range of security issues. However, it is not even easy for security 
administrators to determine which standards should be applied in a target system 
considering the characteristics of a system environment since computer configurations 
could be different based on users’ preferences of operating systems and applications. And 
each standard has different perspectives to interpret configurations so it is not 
manageable without having comprehensive understanding on each standard. So, it is 
fairly a time consuming task to know which standard should be applied properly in a 
target computer and how to apply it. Also, it is necessary to have data not only 
consolidating security information for the system, but also capturing characteristics of 
different environments properly. Moreover, the structure of data should be expandable 
since security risks in the system keep growing continuously. 
Third, the environments of a system can vary based on the role and services that the 
system provides. There exist many operating system dependent security assessment tools. 
However, more intuitive but system-independent security assessment is required.  By 
using system-level implementation, tool is applicable to the various environments in a 
seamless manner. This tool provides security assessment consistency for diverse 
environments.  
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Last but not least, security assessment with the specific viewpoint of security 
administrators is more effective since their interests on a particular aspect of 
vulnerabilities in a system would help clearly recognize current risks and its affects to the 
system. In other words, providing user-centric security assessment helps security 
administrators monitor security gaps between security countermeasures and their point of 
view on vulnerabilities. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 addresses motivation of this work and 
problem statements including the overview of security assessment standard and the 
importance of event-driven comprehensive security measurement system, followed by the 
related work in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we also overview background technologies that 
are leveraged to realize the proposed security assessment approach.  Chapter 4 describes 
an event-driven continuous monitoring framework and elaborates each component in our 
framework. Furthermore, we show the architecture of system-independent event-driven 
monitoring system. The implementation details including algorithms and evaluation of 
our system are discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 concludes this thesis along with the 
contributions and future works.  
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2. REALTED WORK 
Risk assessment has been part of core security methods. Most risk assessments have 
been performed with risk analysis and monitoring. While evaluating security disciplines, 
applying undifferentiated security disciplines is not straightforward since each 
environment has its own nature. Also, the security administrators who analyze 
vulnerabilities existed in the system may want to see analysis results based on their 
preferences. In this thesis, we focus on an event-driven system analysis approach to 
identify risks and then show results in accordance with the preferences of the security 
administrators. To achieve this, we first review relevant methods that we leverage in this 
thesis including Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), Common 
Information Model (CIM), and ontology. To accomplish event-driven risk assessment in 
different environments, we introduce continuous monitoring system that can work under 
various system settings. We then discuss the integrated security requirement framework 
and risk assessment method to check security compliance. 
Many companies have adopted Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) and 
introduced real time tools to mainly identify systems’ weaknesses by investigating 
system configurations based on security policies and compliance requirements. Previous 
government reports show that proper review of vulnerability and SIEM had been done 
early, but the correlation between continuous monitoring and SIEM has not been 
achieved. Security assessment has been rather periodically performed so far [2].  
Most organizations have to patch and configure their products for the security reason and 
their products are maintained by the security postures at any given time to keep the 
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systems safe. Furthermore, organizations are obligated to be compliant with sets of 
security requirements. To support such a critical obligation, Security Content Automation 
Protocol (SCAP) was introduced and published by NIST [3]. To avoid any unnecessary 
steps in security assessment, SCAP works with OVAL. By taking advantages of SCAP, 
maintaining enterprise systems, inspecting system security configuration settings, and 
examining signs of potential compromises in the systems have been extremely efficient 
[4]. SCAP can collect vulnerability information from different vendors and integrate 
information into definitions that contain checking methods so that security administrators 
can examine security risks with a given set of compliance requirements. The current 
version of SCAP performs measurement of system assurance and monitoring of security 
setting [5]. The SCAP uses top-down approach for the measurement and OVAL is the 
main step of the assessment process, which contains security contents about the way to 
measure a specific machine’s state associated with system details. Based on this system 
details, OVAL generates assessment results by expressing the state of each machine. To 
achieve goal of sharing information, OVAL enforces structural standard but it cannot 
provide flexible measurement because of this structural dependency.  
CIM and Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM) architecture [29] are another 
related work. There are many approaches that took advantage of CIM and WBEM to 
achieve their security goal [25]. In these approaches, the CIM is mostly used to collecting 
and gathering data from operating system configuration. Also, CIM is utilized to retrieve 
data from a system and provide such data to check the current security status in the 
system. Even though these approaches resulted in an effective set of security controls and 
risk management process, it may increase the burdens of data management since data 
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storage can be quickly filled due to the infinite number of events incautiously caused by 
end users. Such events might cause security breaches in the system so each reflected data 
should be compared or matched to the overall security standard. 
The ontology represents a set of relational concepts within domain and the relationships 
among its concepts of domain can be represented with CIM. In other words, CIM defines 
classes and relations can be represented by ontology [29]. There exist several research 
approaches to make connection between system information and security features, using 
both ontology and CIM at the same time [35].  However, making ontology and expanding 
the data relevant to vulnerable information still need to be studied. . Especially, gathering 
information by CIM and generating ontology based on the gathered information are 
costly. Suppose we deal with the cloud-based environments and there exist many 
different configurations in the virtual machine (VM) depending on users’ preferences. 
Under such environments, ontology has to cover all configuration changes in each VM 
but it will be a time-consuming task. Therefore, it is necessary to develop systematic 
procedures for leveraging CIM and ontology to represent vulnerabilities in a more 
effective manner,  
Government agencies and organizations started to focus on developing continuous 
monitoring systems. As a result, the Federal Network Security (FNS) Branch of 
Department of Homeland Security launched the Continuous Asset Evaluation, Situational 
Awareness, and Risk Scoring (CAESARS) [8]. The objective of their project is to build a 
concrete vendor-neutral architecture and incorporate the main elements of the 
Department of State (DOS).  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Description of the CAESARS System 
CAESARS system has integrated security postures with determining the gaps between 
current state and security baseline and ensuring that the every system and application 
does not contain tested potential security problematic configurations. For ensuring that 
every system meets security policies and compliance requirements, CAESARS system 
provides four subsystems as shown in Figure 1: sensor subsystem, database/repository 
subsystem, analysis/risk scoring subsystem, and presentation and reporting subsystem.  
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3. BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGY 
3.1 COMMON INFORMATION MODEL 
Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) published the CIM standard to 
exchange management information about managed elements that is the structure of the 
information contained among multiple parties. By using CIM, software, which manages 
information, does not need to be written again for converting operations or information 
since CIM attempts to unify and extend the existing instrumentation and management 
standards using Object-Oriented Constructs and Design (OOD) [26]. CIM model 
leverages OOD-based techniques to have richer representation of management data. The 
architecture of CIM is convertible to Unified Modeling Language (UML) which can be 
represented between CIM classes and CIM associations, either ways. So, the CIM can not 
only describe classes and its relationship among classes of objects, but also enables to 
have various relationships with other managed elements. The CIM is composed of two 
parts: CIM infrastructure specification and CIM schema. The CIM infrastructure 
specification provides managed elements and its relationships by allowing specialization 
of common base elements to access specific features of the system. The system needs to 
provide its information as an object through the CIM managed elements. The CIM 
schema is a conceptual schema which enables the CIM client to communicate with 
managed elements in a system. CIM schema covers most elements in the computer 
product, such as computer systems, operating systems, networks, middleware, services 
and storages. The strength of CIM schema is that it can be extended seamlessly with the 
common functionality defined in CIM schema. 
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Users can specify, visualize and document software systems using UML from the Object 
Management Group (OMG) [9]. The UML-based specification is converted to the 
corresponding CIM MOF file and vice versa. The following example is a package for the 
mapping between CIM MOF file and UML elements.  
 
Figure 2: Mapping between CIM MOF file and UML elements 
In Figure 2, the CIM_DeviceA has the UMLPackagePath qualifier, so its value gets 
information under a target package path of a device as UML elements shows. For the 
CIM_DeviceB class, the UMLPackagePath is not specified so the default 
UMLPackagePath is applied and vice versa. This is a simple example that shows how 
CIM schema is applied to MOF files. UML package whose package path under a target 
package shall own the UML class which a CIM class is mapped with the inheritance. 
This general mapping between CIM MOF and UML elements allows CIM to support any 
computer environments.  
Package default::Class CIM_DeviceB
+Propery pa
Package Device::Class CIM_deviceA
+Property pb
Package 
CIMSchema::
Package CIM
Package 
CIMSchema
Package 
CIM::Package 
default
Package 
CIM::Package 
Device
CIM.mof
#pragma include “Device.mof”
Device.mof
[UML 
PackagePath(“CIM::Device”)]
Class CIM_DeviceA{
String pa;
}
Class CIM_DeviceB{
String pb;
}
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3.1.1 WINDOWS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTATION 
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a set of extensions to the 
Windows Drive Model (WDM), which is the framework for device drivers that provide 
system interfaces to provide information and notification based on CIM and WBEM. 
WMI enables to managing windows-based personal computers both locally and remotely 
by Desktop Management Interface (DMI), which is a standard framework that tracks and 
manages components in desktop, laptop or server. By leveraging existing management 
applications, WMI can also generate and provide comprehensive management as a 
uniform and reference model by acquiring management data from various heterogeneous 
sources in a common way.  
 
Figure 3: WMI Architecture 
WMI Core
(CIM Object Manager)
WMI
Repository
WMI COM API
WMI Scripting API
Scripts
C/C++
Client
SNMP WMI
provider
SNMP WMI
provider
CIMv2 WMI
provider
Windows (Win32)
Managed entity
CIM Inter-Op
System Management
(instrumentation objects)
.NET WMI provider
.NET managed
Application/entity
...
WMI consumers
(management 
applications)
WMI infrastructure
WMI providers and 
managed objects
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The main components of WMI architecture stem from CIM components. Those 
components are WMI provider, the CIM object manager (CIMOM) and CIM repository 
as illustrated in Figure 3.  
WMI providers monitor and communicate with physical and logical system components 
made up with operating system services and utilities, hardware and applications. WMI 
providers are an extension of WDM and send its data information into WMI repository 
with the managed format described in MOF files. These providers mainly provide 
information as a set of managed objects in response to the requests coming from CIMOM 
received in a WMI consumer. The MOF files can be compiled by MOF compiler in WMI 
and added into WMI repository for the managed data.  
CIMOM manages the data transfer among WMI providers, the CIM repository, and 
management applications. The procedure of transferring data is made in the following 
steps: the WMI provider retrieves information from resources and CIM repository stores 
information requested by WMI consumer layer. CIMOM creates indication subscription 
in the CIM repository and contacts WMI provider to receive the requested information 
from clients. The CIMOM sends the received information from the provider to the WMI 
consumer. The data can be manipulated by WMI Query Language (WQL), which is 
written in a SQL-like format. And WMI has a function to notify events coming from the 
provider both locally and remotely. WMI event notification is capable of monitoring the 
state of the systems across the network. There are two kinds of event notification: 
synchronous and asynchronous event notifications. Synchronous event notification is 
paused until the method call returns the collection of objects. In contrast, asynchronous 
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event notification allows continuous execution of WMI methods or provider methods 
while returns the collection of objects.  
CIM repository is the storage to store the registered information that providers and 
applications provided with the managed format added in the repository by MOF files. 
The data in CIM repository can be easily out-of date, therefore, CIMOM executes queries 
to extract the changed data dynamically from the repository. This helps consumers 
receive the recent event information that providers give. 
3.1.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF CIM IN WMI 
WMI is an infrastructure to support CIM model and Microsoft Windows-specific 
extension of CIM. However, all schemas in the WMI repository are CIM-based schemas. 
Only “cimv2” namespace, which obtains data from Microsoft Win32 APIs, is CIM 
schema-based such as CIM core, system devices and application models. For example, 
Windows 7 introduced Win32_PowerPlan WMI class. This class resides in the cimv2 
WMI namespace so that any script or code can trigger this information to receive power 
status of current machine from the client by executing WQL. When the CIMOM receives 
the request for information, the CIMOM checks an appropriate provider if the provider 
support dynamic data or notification of events of the requested information. If not, 
CIMOM forwards the request to the appropriate provider to return the requested 
information from resources. The return data format of WMI provider is described in 
CIM. The result format is standardized so any environment can use this data format to 
receive data and use it. There are many useful CIM classes--especially CIM_RecordLog 
class that can log and filter out other logs by names. By using this class, a system can 
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derive notifications of event information from a provider. WMI already have running 
Win32 classes to record log files for the event so that system can get event information 
by using WQL. Using .NET framework, applications can be developed using data from 
WMI classes. It means the system can assess management information in an enterprise 
environment. If the provider does not exist in certain management information related to 
CIM, the system can create a provider based on CIM class and receive information from 
the created provider, which allows the system to access all WMI data. 
3.2 ONTOLOGY 
Knowledge sharing and reuse have many challenging issues [10]. The sharing and 
reuse of data is currently achieved but still lacks understanding of data semantics between 
entities. Sharing information in knowledge means the transfer from the sender to the 
receiver that could not use the same format for data representation in most cases. In this 
reason, extra care must be taken when the messages are transferred. The information is 
transferred in the way of structured format that is understandable to both sender and 
receiver. The message should be also transferred between sender and receiver who may 
use different formats. It means each party needs to process the transferred information on 
the knowledge base through the use of logical language. Moreover, the architecture of 
relational database does not represent n : m relationship [27]. The additional table is 
needed to transform n : m relationship into a 1 : n and a 1 : m relationships. This 
necessary step needs to be solved without schema modification. The lack of standard 
causes many unnecessary steps to share and reuse data between two sides. The effort to 
generate standardized results in the new way of sharing knowledge, ontology. Ontology 
can solve this problem by using formal and real-world semantics. Ontology provides 
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formal semantics, which are machine and human understandable data format. Ontology 
attempts to detect every possible domain and support broad axioms for the expression of 
knowledge and it is ideally formal vocabularies shared by a group that is interested in a 
specific domain. 
In the area of semantic web, ontology is used in various research fields such as 
knowledge engineering, database design, and information retrieval and extraction. The 
meaning of human understandable is that a word is in natural language and its 
relationships are reasonable to the human. The example of human understandable 
relationship is is-a relation, which denotes an association between super and sub 
concepts. The relationship describes the fact that one super concept is more general than 
another sub concept. The more general concepts are senior to the more specialized 
concepts in an is-a hierarchy as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: is-a hierarchy example  
The relationship between entities may make many different conclusions. For example, 
both student and researcher can be a person. PhD student can be student and researcher, 
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but MCS student cannot. This conclusion can be drawn by both computer and human 
since the formal nature of the relation can be explained respectively in this diagram. Real 
world objects can be described in the concepts. For example, John is instance of PhD 
student. The instance of relation means an actual concept derived by the PhD student. 
And all super concepts have is-a relation so that John must be an instance of the concepts 
such as PhD student, Student, Researcher, and Person. Ontology brings advantage of data 
and relation representation with several features such as flexibility and interoperability. 
3.2.1 SPARQL PROTOCOL AND RDF QUERY LANGUAGE  
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) [11] is the first language developed 
for the semantic web. RDF includes machine readable metadata to existing data on the 
web. RDF Schema (RDFS) [12] extends RDF with some basic (frame-based) ontological 
modeling primitives such as classes, properties and instances. Instance-of and subclass-of 
relationships are also introduced through RDFS. RDF has the object-attribute-value 
triple. It is commonly written as (O, A, V) [13][14]. Figure 5 is an example of RDF graph 
with this structure.  
 
Figure 5: RDF graph example 
In Figure 5, an oval describes the resource and arrows that connect two resources show 
the predicate of the resource. The basic building block can be represented as follows:  
#john1 #johnsmith
“John”
“Smith”
hasNameOf
hasLastNameOf
hasFirstNameOf
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Figure 6: RDF triples example 
RDF graph in Figure 5 is converted to RDF triples in Figure 6 with a predicate of each 
connection of resources. These simple three statements become very complicated in 
XML serialization. This is one of benefits that we can get from ontology. The XML 
schema describes how XML document ought to be ordered and combined in the 
predefined structure. In contrast, RDF schema does not describe the syntax of the RDF 
description, but the interpretation of each statement. This means RDFS defines classes 
and sub-classes for the class hierarchy, properties and its hierarchy. RDFS has the benefit 
of increasing formality of their subject and standard entailment of relationship among 
data.  
The official W3C document describes SPARQL as follows [13]: “Most forms of SPARQL 
queries contain a set of triple patterns called a basic graph pattern. Triple patterns are 
like RDF triples except that each of the subject, predicate and object may be variable. A 
basic graph pattern matches a sub-graph of the RDF data when RDF terms from that 
sub-graph may be substituted for the variables.” SPAQL is generally graph matching 
execution [14]. For example, the query in Figure 7 returns the all football club that is 
based in Barcelona.  
(hasNameOf, #john1, #johnsmith)
(hasFirstNameOf, #johnsmith, “John”)
(hasLastNameOf, #johnsmith, “Smith”)
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Figure 7: SPARQL Query Example 
In Figure 7, the query is written in the SPARQL query language and this example shows 
that it gets data set, which is strictly associated with two edges. One edge is ‘hasTypeOf’ 
which connects between club and FootballClub objects, and other is labeled as 
‘hasRegionOf’, which is limited to the data set in Barcelona entity. The entities which 
match these conditions are allocated to the variable name of ‘?Club’ and the manager, is 
returned if an entity meets the both edges. A simple SPARQL query can be converted 
into an SQL statement. 
3.3 OPEN VULNERABILTY AND ASSESSMENT LANGUAGE 
FDCC and USGCB published the checklist for checking vulnerabilities in the 
configuration of computer environments [15]. Security checklist is stored in National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD), which includes many kinds of security configuration 
including operating systems, applications and so on. The XML-based format for the 
checklists is specified in the Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) that 
is fundamental part to check the presence of vulnerabilities and configuration issues in a 
target system. This means that OVAL-based checklist called OVAL definition describes 
the technical details about security vulnerabilities and configurations in XML-based 
?Club
?Manager
hasRegionOf
hasManagerOf
hasTypeOf
Select ?manager ?club
Where{
?manager hasManagerOf ?club.
?club       hasTypeOf FootballClub.
?club       hasRegionOf Barcelona.
}
FootballClub
Barcelona
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format. Security baseline in SCAP uses OVAL for checking baseline settings. OVAL is 
used to determine which vulnerabilities exist on a system and generate reports, and then 
system administrator deploys software patches or gets security countermeasures from 
assessment tools and takes proper actions based on organizational discipline or policies. 
3.3.1 USAGE OF OVAL DEFINITION  
OVAL is a standard to standardize the assessment information across the various 
security tools and services. The information security community has developed OVAL 
definitions by collaborating to create OVAL language and maintaining definitions in the 
OVAL repository from many participants and stakeholders. Industry, academy and 
government organizations try to share their vulnerability information through OVAL 
definitions. This effort helps share security issues and protects systems in a professional 
manner. OVAL works in three main steps: collecting characteristics from systems for 
testing, testing the presence of a machine state, and evaluating systems. For the collection 
of characteristics from a target system, it collects information of target system, system 
configurations, and other security relevant configurations in a standard XML format. By 
gathered system characteristics, assessment tool could receive vulnerability information 
associated with system. Any mismatched configurations will be eliminated or further 
examined. The standardized OVAL that encodes the vulnerability details of a specific 
machine state can check the system whether the system has any vulnerabilities, 
configuration setting meets the security policy, and patch is performed in the wide range 
of computer systems. There are many operating system based schemas to test a specific 
OS platform and its applications. Core schema and individual component schema tests 
basic and detailed system states of operating system platforms or applications, 
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respectively. The result schema defines a standard XML format for generating an 
evaluation report. The report contains current configuration information of a system 
against OVAL definitions. The result schema allows administrators to compare the 
system with standards for verifying the existence of vulnerabilities or configurations 
which do not match security policies on the system 
3.3.2 OVAL STRUCTURE AND ITS USE 
The OVAL definition schema consists of two part of schema: core schema and a 
number of component schemas.  
The core schema provides a structure of an OVAL definition to express metadata that is 
independent of an OVAL definition, which includes CVE identifier, platform under 
affected attribute, and description of the definition. Component schema is different from 
core schema and it defines the vulnerability, configuration and security issues within an 
OS platform and its applications. 
 
Figure 8: OVAL Definition Core Structure 
Definitionefinition
Metadataetadata
TitleTitle Affectedffected referencereference Descriptionescription
platformplatfor productproduct
CriterionCriterion
CriteriaCriteria
Extended
Definition
Extended
efinition Definition
efinition
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In Figure 8, core schema has many components of the definition. The structure of the 
OVAL definition contains two main categories: metadata and criteria. Metadata includes 
information of each definition and refers to CVE. The description in metadata shows how 
this vulnerability could happen. The criteria in Figure 8 show how to draw this 
vulnerability by specifying which security check should be performed on the system. It 
has two categories: extend_definition mainly deals with the configuration of application, 
hardware, or operating system and criterion is to scan configurations by checking 
whether it meets any specific conditions. 
To provide vulnerable information to different environments, we need to implement a 
flexible database which handles various structures for the target environments. Classical 
relational database or XML has limitations to provide such flexibility. To represent RDF 
triple mentioned in Figure 6, the classical relational database needs an additional table to 
link values and join operation to return data to the requester. The XML also needs many 
lines to represent these data and relationships in the system. With the help of ontology, 
this problem could be handled by using RDF triple. Taking advantage of this flexibility, 
we can share various vulnerability data with different environments.  
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Figure 9, OVAL definition in XML 
In Figure 9, core schema is described. For example, the title of this schema is OWA For 
Exchange Server Data Validation XSS Vulnerability. And its affected family is Microsoft 
Windows operating system and the reference shows the CVE identifier.  
The component schema contains a specific path (object) and values (state) that identify 
the system configuration, which matches the vulnerability. Definition is composed of 
many different vulnerable configurations. Each criterion has its own test that contains an 
object and a state with a specific path and certain value, respectively. The matching of 
two paths and values declares a security issue but it may not a real vulnerability at this 
point. Extended definition is to check the installed software. The combination of the 
criterion and extended definition can finally declare a specific vulnerability. 
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Figure 10: Criteria components schema of OVAL definition 
In Figure 10, the structure of the component schema is illustrated. By checking object and 
state in a test, system administrators verify whether the test hits the vulnerable 
configuration on the system. In Figure 11, a specific example in this test has one object 
that shows the file ‘owaauth.dll’ and its state ‘6.5.7653.38’ with the path. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Criterion of test in OVAL XML 
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OVAL criteria have two operators: ‘and’ and ‘or’. The combination of ‘and’ and ‘or’ 
helps define a vulnerability in the OVAL definition. Criterion variable refers to another 
object, which shares the same path. 
To use OVAL in many places, we design the basic structure of OVAL ontology to 
include attributes described in the OVAL definition, test, object and state related to the 
environments.  
 
Figure 12: OVAL Ontology: Basic Structure 
In Figure 12, we show the basic structure of the OVAL definition applied in ontology. 
Definition ID is an unique identifier and Test ID is the attribute which could be 
duplicated in different Definition IDs.  So, connections between Definition ID and Test 
ID can be reusable in other relations. This basic structure is helpful not only 
understanding structure of OVAL ontology, but also further expanding information in 
different attributes. For example, the registry appears in only Microsoft Windows 
platforms. As mentioned previously, object has the path of the vulnerability so that a 
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registry path information can be added to the Object ID. In the same way, the value of 
registry is added in the State ID. This expansion allows ontology to support diverse 
structures of OVAL definition and have the tool return its data for taking care of many 
different systems by using relationships in RDF triple. Also, ontology enables users to 
add any relationship into ontology without schema modification. In addition to such 
advantages, we attempt to improve our structure for enhancing the performance in 
returning information.  
 
Figure 13: OVAL Criteria Operators  
Every definition has its own criteria. Figure 13 shows a decision path based on logical 
operators to facilitate various criteria. For example, the definition indicates that it would 
be vulnerability if either criteria 1 and 2 or criteria 3 and 4 meet conditions mentioned in 
tests. In OVAL XML file, the published assessment tool should check all criteria until a 
criteria match conditions in the definition. Also, it is constructed as a hierarchical 
structure, which facilitates top-down approach. For instance, it would first check the 
version of operating system and product in metadata of a definition. Then it starts 
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checking criteria until it finds matched combination of criteria. To overcome the 
performance issue of such a top-down but exhaustive approach, we introduce the notion 
of clustered area for checking the system effectively. The subsequent section will discuss 
our enhancement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
4. EVENT-DRIVEN CONTINUOUS MONITORING FRAMEWORK 
The continuous monitoring has been recognized as a critical strategy and it could be 
realized by sharing incident information among government agencies and various 
organizations. As mentioned in previous chapters, this strategy has mainly focused on the 
way for continuously detecting and publishing new vulnerabilities or configuration 
problems. Figure 14 briefly describes the risk management framework proposed by NIST 
[16][17]. Based on this framework, this thesis concentrates on tasks in the phase 6: 
continuous monitoring. The life cycle of the framework determines whether the system 
meets the security requirements periodically but does not consider any changes with 
respect to the user’s behavior such as installing applications or patching updates. Even 
though security assessment periodically generates and maintains vulnerability 
information in the security repository, ensuring system assurance and protecting target 
systems would be in vain without considering various vulnerability information and 
continuously monitoring configuration changes. Therefore, the system should perform 
event-driven comprehensive security assessment and environment independent 
monitoring. 
 
Figure 14: Risk Management Framework 
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Normally, the process of security monitoring deals with detection of risks in the system 
and active management of the detected risks. By adopting this method, security risks 
must be checked whenever suspicious events occur. In this thesis, we extend such 
conventional processes to include event-driven monitoring that facilitates usage reduction 
of system resources and event-related configuration check. 
 
Figure 15: Event-driven continuous monitoring framework 
4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
To provide comprehensive vulnerability information and environment independent 
event-driven continuous monitoring in the target system, we propose the event-driven 
continuous monitoring framework. The proposed framework has three main domains as 
is illustrated in Figure 15: vulnerability server, OVAL ontology server, and agent. Each 
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domain is designed to perform specific tasks as follows: ontology server is to generate 
vulnerability information from OVAL fed by National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
and provide security data to the agent through the network. To provide information that 
can support a target system in different environments, we also introduce high-level 
reasoning with vulnerability information to extract data based on environmental 
characteristics given by agents. Agents play an important role for gathering and scanning 
system information based on ontology. By using CIM discussed in the previous chapter, 
agents can be deployed in not only different operating systems, but also various devices 
such as mobile and cloud platforms. Agents can get notification of configuration changes 
by using CIM event classes. The role of vulnerability server is to search machines with 
the deployed agent in the network, receive detected vulnerabilities from agents, and 
verify if those vulnerabilities really exist in a target system. For analyzing and verifying 
the target system, we also use an OVAL interpreter to generate a report. OVAL 
interpreter validates the target system and generates the results for the security 
administrators.  
4.2 EVENT-DRIVEN CONTINUOUS MONITORING  
Minimizing computation costs and increasing assessment reliability of a target 
system are primary roles of the agent. We present an agent model that can detect security 
vulnerabilities in the system. Usually, vulnerability is considered as a logical combination 
of properties that can be presented in the target system. Properties in the system can vary 
depending on the nature of environments and security problems are associated with 
vulnerabilities in the system. One simple example of vulnerability is a specific running 
process (e.g. httpd), a specific open port (e.g. 80), and a specific version of the system 
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(e.g. 2.6.10.rc). In other words, vulnerability may require several properties. To monitor 
events from a system, CIM event log which is one of CIM model for operating system 
information is used. WMI which is Microsoft extension of CIM is to support the CIM 
model for performing retrieval and event notification of the system. With such benefits of 
the system, data is accessed by COM/DCOM API in providers. There are many built-in 
providers in WMI. Among many providers, event providers handle event-driven 
continuous monitoring, which captures events and notifies the consumer. Windows NT 
event log provider provides access to data and event notification from the Windows NT 
event log [18]. When Windows NT is booted, it starts the Service Control Managers 
(SCMs). The win32 program event logging service is started up automatically when SCM 
started. Once an event is occurred in a device driver, or an application, it sends the report 
to the event logging service. The service stores the information that can be categorized as 
one of three event log files located in the local system disk: Application Event Log file, 
Security Event Log file, and System Event Log file.  
 
Figure 16: Event log service in Win32 program  
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WMI consumer in figure 3 can also retrieve a particular event from event repository for 
the further analysis. Figure 16 shows the structure of Win32 event logging service and 
how event logging service displays events from each log file. There exist two ways to 
access the event log files: local and remote. By using scripts or execution of a program 
that a system provides, event log file can be locally accessible. Also, the event logging 
service can be accessed by processes running on the local system. With remote procedure 
calls (RPCs), a remote computer can also access the event logs on the local system. All 
requests such as write, read, clear and backup operations on remote event logs are 
forwarded to the service using RPC. Both ways are transparent to the calling process. If 
WMI consumer requests and receives every event from log files checks security breaches 
related to the single event, automated security assessment requires heavy interactions 
with a running operating system to get system information and causes performance 
overhead. So, it is necessary to only extract data from related certain changes of a path 
described in security standards. This means that the system monitors and gathers data 
specified in the OVAL definition, instead of getting every event from the system. In this 
thesis, we narrow down the scope of this task to focus on Microsoft Windows operating 
systems. Every registry event is stored into Windows NT registry. The EventLog registry 
key is composed of event log sub-keys and event source keys. Event log sub-key stores 
the event log information for a specific registry event. Sub-key is mapped to the event 
source key. When an event source key is added to the registry, the name of the event 
source is automatically added to the source value of the corresponding event log sub-key 
by the event logging service.  Event logging service has functions to log the registry and 
file related events such as creating, modifying, and deleting the value of registry or file. 
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By using this event log service, changing information of certain file or registry can be 
monitored and used for the comparison between current and standard values.  
CIM has an abstraction of event logger class for the system event log. In CIM, a CIM 
indication represents the occurrence of an event that changes the state of the environment 
of the component of the environment. For example, indicating the one service in the 
operating system is started or stopped or a certain application is installed so configuration 
is changed accordingly. An instance of the CIM_Indciation class represents the concrete 
indication of the occurrence of an event. Modeling CIM life cycle events of 
InstIndication includes instance creation, deletion, modification, method invocation and 
read access. From the security perspective, a system needs to distinguish interesting 
events from all collected events. This helps save resource usages and improves 
performance of security assessment by narrowing down the assessment scope of current 
system. For example, WMI provides WMI Registry Event Classes that can obtain registry 
information to interact with vulnerability information provider. Registry Event Classes is 
derived from _SystemClass class. The Registry event classes have four classes: 
RegistryEvent, RegistryKeyChangeEvent, RegistryTreeChangeEvent, and 
RegistryValueChangeEvent. RegistryEvent is an abstraction class for deriving other 
registry event classes. RegistryValueChangeEvent focuses on the changed value of a 
specific key since it can facilitate the specific path and value specified in the OVAL-
based security standard. Other classes such as RegistryKeyChangeEvent and 
RegistryTreeChangeEvent monitor subkeys so additional process steps are needed. The 
indication of an event is made by Windows Query Language (WQL), which is the subset 
of ANSI Structured Query Language (SQL) in Microsoft Windows. The syntax of WQL 
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is similar to SQL. WQL makes a system to get specific event information by narrowing 
the scope of an event. File changes in Microsoft Windows are also detected by using 
WMI. By comparing between changes and security standards, a system can determine 
whether changes on system configuration can affect the level of system security.  
 
Figure 17: Agent Diagram 
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check security risks and monitor future changes with respect to the vulnerability 
described in the security standard. Based on collected computer information, ontology 
server extracts and provides configurations, compliances, and vulnerability information 
to the agent. The agent parses such information from ontology server and checks initial 
system state of a target system. This initial check of the target system leads the system to 
retrieve current vulnerabilities against standards and notify which vulnerabilities are 
found. After the initial check, the agent continuously monitors events associated with the 
vulnerability information received from ontology server. For configuration checking, the 
agent has different comparison methods because each operating system has its own 
structure. For example, Microsoft Windows operating system has registry as hierarchical 
database manager. Registry contains information how and what program is installed in 
while other operating systems store individual files in the file system. Scanner scans and 
checks each value based on security data received from OVAL ontology server. 
Continuous monitoring thread captures events from providers continuously and 
vulnerability checker thread compares captured events and standards for each event.  
The agent detects vulnerability based on the following 4-tuples: (R, F, W, M), where R is 
the set of registry vulnerability; F is the set of file vulnerability; W is the set of WQL 
vulnerability; and M is the set of Metabase vulnerability of IIS configurations. 
Consider R, F, M, and W has each subset as follows: 
                                                (1) 
                                            (2) 
 37 
 
                                             (3) 
                                         (4) 
Each component is represented as the composition of path and value of each 
configuration: 
                                                 ))  (1)-1 
                                             )) (2) -1 
                                                 ))  (3) -1 
                     )                ))  (4)-1 
WMI query checks WMI information with two elements: value and existence. Existence 
is to check the existence status of certain query described in  . From (1), (2), (3), and 
(4) definitions, the notion of vulnerability is formally defined as follows: 
              {            (              )}  
                                 (5) 
The following example shows how this definition can be realized with real world cases:  
Consider OVAL definition has a vulnerability description 
{oval:org.mitre.oval:def:996}which deals with file and print sharing service in Microsoft 
Windows operating systems. For instance, Microsoft Windows 95, Windows 98, and 
Windows ME do not properly check the password for a file share, which allows remote 
attackers to bypass access controls by sending a 1-byte password that matches the first 
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character of the real password. This vulnerability is defined with the following 
composition of configuration properties: Vulnerability = {           }. This definition 
includes two registries and one file value. The first registry checks a key path of 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion which value is 
Windows 98. The other registry checks the existence of the following path 
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Service\UitlMan{5c773859-bb96-48fa-875b-
6a58aae072f4}. In addition, the value of the following file %windir%\System\vserver.vxd 
is checked to determine whether its value is less than 4.10.2001.0. Once these R1, R2, 
and F meet the each condition, the system declares a vulnerability entitled 
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:966 is detected. Information collector waits for an event which is 
triggered by any environmental changes. However, by processing only related 
information, our approach enhances performance by reducing the number of 
comparisons.  
4.3 VULNERABILITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
To provide security standards to the agent in a seamless manner, we introduce 
ontology as a security information provider. The system has to handle various existing 
documents containing security problems published by different organizations. Even 
though each standard document has a structured format, its structures and attributes vary. 
Therefore, making a generic structure regarding to the security standards is needed. To 
address this issue, we use ontology because it provides not only data and its relationships, 
but also foundation of high-level reasoning. Particularly, a formal logic based on well-
defined data and knowledge bases in ontology helps users deduce the implicit and 
inherent knowledge. In our system, ontology can extract and provide information about 
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operating system vulnerability, application security issues, and security metrics as 
mentioned in OVAL. Based on preloaded data from ontology, agent can monitor and 
generate reports of current system status associated with vulnerabilities based on OVAL. 
To reduce errors to generate ontology from OVAL XML, the data structure is needed to 
verify each vulnerability definition since OVAL definition has different structures in 
criteria part. 
The ontology approach consists of two parts: the first part is vulnerabilities based on the 
operating systems and its dependencies of operating systems and the second part is to get 
vulnerability with various structures. The second part of ontology approach needs two 
inputs: security event and its operating system.  
The ontology is coded in OWL (Web Ontology Language [20]) and the Jena API which 
supports various types of OWL. The base case for algebra is a set of triple patterns which 
is called basic graph patterns (BGP). The example of BGP is as follows: 
{(?X, name, ?name), (?X, email, ?email)} 
In this example, we can retrieve information of name and email of an entity X. A graph 
pattern expression from basic BGP is based on dom(µ) which is the domain of µ and µ(P) 
which is the set obtained from a basic graph pattern P. The example of BGP is as follows: 
µ = {?X → R1, ?name → john, ?email → j@ed.ex}  
P = {(?X, name, ?name), (?X, email, ?email)}  
µ(P) = {(R1, name, john), (R1, email, j@ed.ed)}  
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The mapping µ1, and µ2 are compatible if and only if they agree in their shared 
variables: µ1(?X) = µ2(?X) for every ?X   dom(µ1)   dom (µ2).  
µ1 = {?X → R1, ?name → John}    
µ2 = {?X → R1, ?email → j@ed.ed}   
µ1   µ2 = {?X → R1, ?name → John, ?email → J@ed.ex}  
The evaluation of the BGP P over a graph G is denoted as    ]] , which is the set of all 
mappings µ such that dom(µ) is the set of variables in P and µ(P) is the subset of G. The 
triple patterns and BGP are used for both system information extraction and detection of 
vulnerability based on OVAL language. 
4.3.1 OPERATING SYSTEM BASED SECURITY TEST  
Figure 18 and 20 show OVAL definition and criterion which are connected to test 
id. It also shows the extended definition that includes reference to the other definition in 
OVAL language. Metadata in OVAL definition contains many attributes and one of 
attributes is an affected attribute. An affected attribute has two sub attributes: platform 
and product and the further information are described in [21]. Platform has the operating 
system information that the definition can be applied to. By providing platform 
information in xml, the identified operating system will be checked by each definition. 
Product indicates that the definition is applicable when a specific application is installed 
in a target system. Breaking the OVAL language into components, a schema enables 
tools to reduce process overhead and execution time. However, the drawback of this 
approach is that schema structure is difficult for a user to navigate since its structure 
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varies so it would have many different structures to be covered. Definition combines one 
or more tests using logical operator AND or OR operator. It wraps metadata and criteria 
to understand what and how processes will be taken for checking vulnerability on the 
target system. Definition has a unique id which starts with ‘oval:’ followed by three letter 
code ‘def’, and ending with integer. Each id is associated with criteria that outline what 
will be tested. The criteria consist of one or more tests with logical AND or OR operator.  
Again, the process overhead and execution in continuous monitoring are important 
factors to achieve in our framework. In case that OVAL language continuously performs 
checking and validating tests and reference definitions, the system resources will be 
easily exhausted and execution time would be dramatically increased. Thus, our approach 
uses only environment related data via ontology. The basic idea is to enumerate all 
configurations including their values and potential vulnerable settings on a target system.  
In Microsoft Windows operating systems, there are four types of vulnerability: File, 
registry, WQL, and Metabase. To get vulnerability information based on type, we provide 
a formal definition used in SPARQL for the extraction of the data from basic definition: 
[[{(     )         ))             )}]]
 
 
 {   {[      )]]     [
      )]] }|                
   )     (6) 
In the equation 6, the set      ) obtains vulnerability information based on operating 
system in a target system, while the set      ) handles null value which causes incorrect 
set of values. The set      ) categorizes the type of vulnerability returned from the test. 
This method shows vulnerability information is first extracted and then it is categorized 
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by type based on the target system. The operator OPT is an extension of mappings in   
with compatible mappings in   and FILTER returns the value only if it satisfies the   
defined in dom( ).  
4.3.2 DETECTION OF VULNERABILITIY  
Guided by the SPARQL protocol, RDF query language and BGP in ontology 
framework, we harness the expressiveness of ontology to classify OVAL definition 
information from the following dimensions: 1) metadata including detailed information 
of vulnerability definition; 2) criteria containing regulatory checking method; and 3) 
domain-specific taxonomies of related test cases based on OVAL. Using object-oriented 
ontology into an interconnected definition, it can be easily expanded to address any 
domains.  
 
Figure 18: OVAL structure 
In Figure 18, OVAL structure is described. The structure of OVAL varies based on 
operating system because each operating system has its own system. The part of metadata 
shows information related to definition like operating system product, which causes 
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potential security issues. And criterion in a criteria part includes vulnerability path and 
value that will be used for checking each configuration. For example, when an event 
including installing application or updating patch occurs, agent tries to discover 
corresponding objects and states from standard. These objects and states compose one 
and more test ids so agent sends its test id to server for identifying additional information 
related to a single vulnerability definition. When server receives information from the 
agent, it starts to figure out additional information. Ontology for OVAL was derived from 
OVAL structure. However, OVAL structures vary so ontology is the best way to address 
the connection of anomalies among different operating systems.  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Metadata structure in ontology 
Figure 19 shows how metadata structure for a definition is constructed based on OVAL. 
Each definition has a unique ID and the definition ID is straightly linked to attributes in 
metadata for providing accurate information. The direct link from the definition ID to its 
attributes can reduce unnecessary steps to reach the attributes that should be extracted. 
For example, the system will use CVE ID associated with detected vulnerability 
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definition to calculate Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) scores. To 
calculate risk scores based on event, ontology provides additional test id which relates to 
vulnerability from detected events.  
 
Figure 20: Criteria structure in ontology 
 
As illustrated in Figure 20, the definition ID has at least one test id and one extended 
definition. Extend definition refers to another definition for verifying the configuration of 
the target computer such as application, operating system and hardware. Referenced 
definition has its own metadata and test id for the information. Definition can include 
more than one test id. As shown in Figure 13, the vulnerability can be detected by 
matching conditions of criteria. So, it is unnecessary to check all test ids. Instead, we 
introduce the notion of clustered test ids to overcome exhaustive check with the 
conditions in all test ids,  
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Figure 21: Clustered test ids  
Clustered test id is constructed based on the type of operator. As shown in Figure 21, it 
implies that Test Ids 1 and 2 are clustered with ‘AND’ operator , while clustered areas 1 
and 2 are associated with ‘OR’ operator.  
4.4 SECURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned earlier, NVD [22] provides not only standardized information of 
most software products available today, but also risk level of each product by score 
associated with CVE included in OVAL. The score is from CVSS [23] which is the tool 
that enables security administrator to quantify the severity and risk of individual product. 
However, CVSS could not be used directly to measure vulnerability in a particular 
product because the design of CVSS only aims at an individual vulnerability. Due to this 
reason, it is sometimes ignored that one product installed in a target system could cause 
multiple vulnerabilities in the system. Moreover, most risk assessment approaches based 
on CVSS do not reflect the concerns from security administrator who performs and 
demands such security assessment tasks. The risk level can vary based on different 
viewpoints on the assessment results. For example, if a security administrator is more 
concerned with the impact on the system, the assessment results should give more weight 
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on the impact of a particular vulnerability. To achieve this goal, we use CPE, CVE and 
CVSS to gather risk information assess the security posture of the software with the given 
weight provided by security administrators. In the subsequent chapters, we present our 
approach to obtain vulnerability measured by OVAL and store vulnerability information 
into our repository. Then, we analyze the collected information using CPE, CVE and 
CVSS based on exploitability and impact aspects.  
4.4.1 MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY RISK 
Rigorous and continuing risk assessment substantially helps protect systems from 
risks and threats. If we use CVSS scoring system to measure risks in the system, we have 
to deal with many CVSS scores since one product may have multiple vulnerabilities and 
the vulnerability has many CVSS score based on status of product. It is necessary to 
consider all vulnerabilities for calculating a risk score based on CVSS scores. Moreover, 
the importance of computer is varied depending on the purpose of each system so that 
security administrators may need to perform security assessment along with their own 
security concern.  
The CVSS base score metrics contain six vectors: Access Vector (AV), Access 
Complexity (AC), Authentication (AU), Confidentiality Impact (CI), Integrity Impact 
(II), and Availability Impact (AI). Three factors, AV, AC, and AU show current state of 
exploit techniques or code availability. It measures availability of exploit codes that could 
increase the attack vector when it is available. For example, suppose web browser has a 
set of ‘network’ in AV, ‘none’ in AU, and ‘low’ in AC. It describes that vulnerability 
exists in a web browser if network is accessible, no authentication is required, and this 
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sever is easy to access. The impact of the system indicates how much it could be 
compromised by the identified vulnerability.  
When OVAL generates the results in XML format, Common Platform Enumeration 
(CPE) is included for defining and explaining the conformance of IT products [34]. CPE 
has three categories: operating system, application, and hardware. In our approach, we 
check the system including running applications, operating system, and hardware with 
OVAL and categorize the detected vulnerability scores by CPE.  
As we mentioned above, we categorize CVE based on CPE. Suppose a software product 
is p in CPE and the number of vulnerability is n associated with the product p which is 
denoted as follows:  
   ∑   
 
   
 
All CVEs in a product p is T which is represented as follows: 
                               
We first separate the CVSS scores into two groups. The one of groups is categorized by 
exploitability as follows: 
In T ∋ EXi and T ∋ EXj 
, EXi = {AVi, ACi, AUi, IIi, CIi, AIi} and EXj = {AVj, ACj, AUj, IIj, CIj, AIj}  
  EXi ≈ EXj where AVi = AVj, ACi = ACj, and AUi = AUj 
 48 
 
This means that a group is categorized only if the scores of AV, AC, and AU are identical 
while, II, CI, and AI do not need to be same. The exploitability-based risk score is 
represented as follows:  
      ∑     ) 
 
   
 
The set of impact IMk corresponding to the      is     , the impact-based risk score is 
formulated as follows: 
      ∑     ) 
 
   
 
In addition, we calculate the vulnerability of IT product based on weights from the 
security administrators. Each weight shows the importance of concern on each vector:  a, 
 β and  γ denotes the importance of operating system (o), importance of hardware (h) 
and the importance of application (a), respectively. Also, we introduce two additional 
inputs from security administrators to express their concerns between exploitability and 
impact factors:  ex represents the exploitability weight and  im shows the impact weight. 
By using these weights and vulnerability scores grouped by CPE, we can compute the 
overall vulnerability scores.  
Exploitability-based scoring method is represented as follows:  
      )  (              )
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The assessment categorized by impact is formulated as follows: 
 
 
      )  (              )
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} 
If the vulnerability is categorized by exploitability, the same exploitability will be added 
to the group without considering impact values.  
As shown in the formula above, we define the risk level based on CPE and CVSS by the 
given weights from security administrator. Given information in the server, we first 
analyze the installed IT products by CPE and identify possible combination of 
exploitability (AV, AC, AU) and impact (II, CI, AI) values. These combinations can be 
basic characteristics of the vulnerability and it reflects IT product characteristics as well. 
The combination of exploitability and impact can be 27 possible cases, respectively. So, 
there exist 54 cases as security metrics that we can use to evaluate. For each case, we can 
also rank vulnerability among others based on security administrator’s point of view.  
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5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
In order to realize the proposed approaches in Chapter 4, we implement the automatic 
system to measure security vulnerability in a target system and generate risk analysis 
results. In our implementation, we focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems  
As mentioned in Figure 14, the architecture consists of three components: OVAL 
ontology server, vulnerability server, and agent. OVAL ontology server is the server 
providing vulnerability information to the agent in conjunction with the target computer’s 
characteristics and it also returns relevant vulnerabilities. Vulnerability server verifies 
certain vulnerability and invokes risk assessment in a target system. The role of agent is 
to provide system characteristics and monitor potential fault configurations that can be 
exploited by the attacker. In subsequent chapters, we will discuss how we implemented 
each component and evaluation results.  
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
Our framework is realized as an event-based monitoring system. Figure 22 shows a 
high level architecture of our system with three components. The left part of architecture 
is ontology server that can support information to the agent which runs in various 
environments. The agent exists in the middle to provide continuous monitoring 
vulnerable events that may cause vulnerability in the system. And the rightmost 
component in the architecture is the vulnerability server, which is used by security 
administrator to figure out the level of risk for a target system. 
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Figure 22: Event-driven Continuous Monitoring Architecture 
In this chapter, we first discuss implementation details of each component in the event-
driven continuous monitoring framework. Then, we articulate the features of our security 
assessment. 
5.1.1 AGENT 
Agent modules are implemented in Java and j-Interop library which enable 
systems to interoperate with COM and DCOM components. The agent delivers computer 
characteristic of the installed machine, receives the server information from vulnerability 
server, finds matched vulnerability on the current configuration and monitors events 
relating to the ones specified in the standards. The agent has functionalities to gather 
system characteristics and send characteristics to vulnerability server. Once vulnerability 
server picks an agent in a target system, vulnerability server sends server information so 
that the agent can collect vulnerable configurations from ontology server. The 
vulnerability information receiver module passes the received security configuration 
information to parse through configuration information with the regular expression. 
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Figure 23: Agent Diagram 
The scanner component consisting of two sub modules: continuous monitor and 
vulnerability checker in Figure 23. The vulnerability checker is to scan vulnerability 
information from vulnerability information parser and figure out existing security 
problems on the system. The continuous monitor is mainly focused on the event which 
can trigger security issues on the system. The continuous monitor subscribes specific 
paths described in security standards in OVAL ontology server for detecting vulnerable 
events caused by end users. Once the vulnerable events are occurred and detected by the 
continuous monitor, the Subhandler in scanner requests additional information to the 
server with respect to the matched events. Vulnerability checker re-scans additional 
information in the system and determines current changes related to security breaches on 
the system. And detected vulnerabilities in the target system are sent to the vulnerability 
server by Subhandler. 
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Figure 24: Continuous Monitor Diagram 
Continuous monitor consists of three threads to check multiple events at the same time. 
Security standards for Microsoft Windows operating systems mainly deal with four 
configurations: registry, file, Metabase and WQL. Event handler monitors the changes 
and reports vulnerable configurations. Of these event handlers, WQL is not event-driven 
so it does not need to be monitored. Three event monitors keep watching the changes of 
system configuration continuously. Each event handler receives the notification of an 
event from WMI repository. One of handlers is the RegistryEventHandler which waits 
for an event related to the registry path and value. This handler uses 
RegistryTreeChangeEvent class in WMI class which observes a path and its sub-path in 
the registry by using two conditions: hive and root_path of a specific path. 
RegistryTreeChangeEvent can capture three events: creation, modification, and deletion 
of sub-registry path or value. However, this RegistryTreeChangeEvent class does not 
monitor a non-existent path so that pre-creation is required before starting to monitor. 
Another handler is the FileEventHanlder which gathers the collection of data from WMI 
by using __InstanceOperationEvent. This __InstanceOperationEvent class monitors 
particular files, including files that do not exist in the logical drive currently. The 
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__InstanceOperationEvent consists of three classes: __InstanceCreationEvent, 
__InstanceDeletionEvent, and __InstanceModificationEvent. Each class stores events of 
creation, deletion, and modification of specific information on a file, respectively. The 
CIM_DATAFILE class represents the collection of data related to a target file. By using 
these two classes, scanner can get which and how file is changed by an event. The last 
handler is MetabaseEventHandler which uses CIM_DATAFILE to look at Metabase file 
which is the collection of data for Internet Information Service (IIS). As the handler uses 
CIM_DATAFILE, it can detect changes on file modification of the Metabase file in the 
system. The continuous monitoring function has SubHandler which handles sub-
procedures when an event is considered as vulnerability captured by each EventHandler. 
SubHandler requests the event detected by SubHandler and checks additional 
vulnerability information to confirm if security problems occur. SubHandler has its own 
thread until finishing the task so that the agent could have many SubHandlers depending 
on the number of events. SubHandler has different functions comparing with 
EventHandler that handles regular expressions. Since OVAL definition provides a path or 
a value of the vulnerability information based on a regular expression so that SubHandler 
needs to manage regular expression in a proper manner to capture fault configurations in 
the system.  
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Algorithm 1 shows how an initial check works without a regular expression. Initial 
checker compares security standards with system configuration since the target computer 
might have potential security problems in the current system configuration. The initial 
checker starts with the collection of system specifications. When it gathers system 
characteristics, it sends the collected data to ontology server and gets vulnerability 
information. Vulnerability information is then used to check the target system. As 
summarized in Algorithm 2, the checker receives data list from the initial checker and 
takes types to check vulnerabilities associated with the type of vulnerability. As 
mentioned earlier, Microsoft Windows operating systems have four types of vulnerability 
determined by the configuration check. The tool scans configurations and compares it 
with the vulnerability information from the previous procedure in Algorithm 1. The agent 
sends the detected vulnerability information to vulnerability server and vulnerability 
server generates a report based on the initial check.  
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As discussed earlier, we use both normal expression and regular expression to compare 
the results from the initial configuration check. The algorithm 4 shows how to check a 
target system in regular expression. The regular expression handler continues to check if 
the registry path exists. The registry paths that are matched with regular expression will 
be stored and re-scanned to discover all sub-paths. If there is no certain path comparing 
with security standards, the path will be removed from the path list. After collecting all 
paths matched with this regular expression, the agent starts checking values in the target 
system.  
 
 5.1.2 ONTOLOGY SERVER 
Ontology server was implemented by JAVA, MySQL, Apache JENA and SPARQL. 
Apache JENA is widely used ontology builder which is Java framework for semantic 
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web applications. Ontology server uses OVAL definitions but data extraction procedure 
is different from the methods used by OVAL. To utilize security standards for a target 
system based on system characteristics received from the agent, we first transformed and 
stored OVAL definitions into ontology server so that we can build a well-defined 
knowledge base based on OVAL.  
 
Figure 25: Ontology Server Diagram 
Ontology server has several components for providing information to the agent. The 
OVAL DB generator parses and stores OVAL to database. The database is able to 
produce XML files that include the OVAL definitions. Criteria contained in OVAL 
definitions have different structures so there is possibility to occur errors while 
transforming ontology to OVAL XML files directly. Therefore, we leverage database to 
maintain OVAL information and reduce potential errors in the transformation [7]. As 
shown in Figure 25, DB generator parses OVAL XML file and stores it into database. 
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Since there are many criteria that contain vulnerability information by object and state, 
several tables can be created in database. In other words, one definition may have 
multiple criteria for defining vulnerability.  
 
Figure 26: OVAL Repository database structure 
To retrieve vulnerability information from database, the join operation should be 
committed. However, join operation combines tuples from different relations so it is 
relatively expensive operation [28]. Instead of optimizing join operation, we use ontology 
generator to create ontology file. The ontology generator retrieves data from database and 
generates ontology file by using Apache JENA library. By using the notion of clustered 
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area, the server efficiently extracts data related to detected vulnerability in the system. In 
Chapter 5.2, we provided the detailed information how the ontology is constructed and 
handles the relevant tasks. The other component in ontology server is vulnerability 
information provider. The vulnerability information provider uses SPARQL to extract 
data from owl file that contains security data and its relation. This component has two 
functionalities to support the agent. One is to deliver security standards to the agent based 
on system characteristics gathered by the agent in a target system. The characteristics 
include MAC address, operating system, IP addresses, user id, password, and so on. The 
other is to supply test-based vulnerability information in the OVAL definition to the 
agent. 
 
Figure 27: OVAL definition criteria 
Figure 27 shows a sample OVAL definition. This OVAL definition has four different 
criteria that cause security issues in Adobe Reader. If the agent detects 
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:6390 in the system and then ontology server returns two test IDs 
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such as  oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:20618 and oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:20935 for helping the 
agent check the related vulnerability in the system. 
5.1.3 VULNERABILITY SERVER 
Vulnerability Server was implemented in Java. Based on the retrieved 
vulnerability information, this server re-verifies vulnerabilities that are detected by the 
agent in the target system. This server has three modules: result analysis, auto 
assessment, and agent management. Result analysis module helps security administrators 
generate a report based on the detected vulnerabilities. This module contains two 
components: security assessment and report display. Security assessment shows 
significant vulnerabilities in a target system based on the importance factor described in 
Chapter 4.4. Report display component provides analysis results of the target system. The 
second module is auto assessment that has three components: oval parser, oval merger, 
and verification tool. Oval parser is to split oval definitions by ID and oval merger 
merges only related IDs to scan the target system. The part of agent management mainly 
controls each agent and this module allows each agent to access both vulnerability server 
and ontology server. In other words, only authorized agents can access both servers.  
The interpreter in auto assessment module only receives the merged oval information 
related to events acquired from agents. Since the oval definition interpreter needs 
information from a target system, the property handler helps the interpreter establish a 
session with a target system remotely by creating config.properties. Once auto 
assessment module receives vulnerability data from the agent, auto assessment module 
generates the vulnerability result through result analysis module including vulnerability 
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information from document and the level of risk based on weights from security 
administrators. 
 
Figure 28: Vulnerability Server Architecture 
Figure 28 depicts the above-mentioned procedures and Algorithm 4 summarizes our risk 
calculation approach mentioned in Chapter 4.4.1.  
 62 
 
 
5.2 EVALUATION RESULTS 
In this chapter, we describe comprehensive and analytical evaluation results of our 
system to demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of our approach.  
In order to test the effectiveness our solution, we measured the extraction time to retrieve 
vulnerability information from ontology. Our experiment was performed with a desktop 
computer (Core2 quad q9650 3.0 GHz CPU, 16GB RAM), and multiple Microsoft 
Windows operating systems including Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Server 
2003 and Server 2008. The extraction task is divided into two parts. One part is to 
measure the number of test-based vulnerability retrieved for a particular operating 
system. As mentioned earlier, our tool should check and obtain the path of the 
vulnerability before starting to launch a monitoring task. Therefore, this measurement 
shows whether our system legitimately retrieves relevant vulnerability.   
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(1) Number of retrieved vulnerability    (2) Vulnerability retrieval time  
Figure 29: Performance measurement in ontology 
Figure 29 shows the number of vulnerability retrieved from OVAL ontology and the 
performance in extracting vulnerability information based on registry and file from 
ontology.  
The other part is to retrieve tests and definitions from OVAL ontology server. Figure 30 
shows that the extraction time is consistent--no matter how many test ids are retrieved 
from ontology. In ontology, each definition contains two types of criterion: test and 
extended definition. The test contains paths and values for the vulnerability while the 
extended definition mainly refers to the other definition. 
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   (1) Number of Retrieved Vulnerabilities        (2) Respond Time of the Vulnerability 
Figure 30: Performance measurement in ontology 
Figure 30 (1) shows the number of vulnerabilities retrieved from ontology and (2) 
describes the extraction time of retrieved vulnerabilities regarding to the detected 
vulnerability in the agent. In Figure 30 (1), there are more than 1,000 vulnerabilities 
extracted by one test id occurred in target machine. We found two reasons why one test 
id could have a relation with many test ids. One reason is that there are many criterions 
which have a AND relationship with detected test id in the definition. And the other 
reason is that test id is used in the multiple definitions. In figure 30 (2), we analyze the 
different reasons for time variations: detection test id in clustered area and refer to 
different definition. The case of detection which is made in clustered area in Figure 21 
decreases the extraction time.  Based on analyses from both graphs, we derive the result 
that extraction time takes at most 5 seconds in many different numbers of retrieved 
vulnerabilities.  
For the measurement of performance in agents, we built a testbed in a cloud by using 
Openstack. Each virtual machine image represents one of the following systems: 
Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 respectively. For brevity, our measurement 
ignored network latency but focused on the vulnerability assessment. 
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Table 1: Initial Evaluation in Agent Tool 
As summarized in Table 1, the performance in single core and 2GB RAM takes 24 
seconds to check the system but takes 15 seconds to scan and detect the vulnerability in 
the system. However, the results between dual core and 4GB RAM and quad core and 
8GB RAM did not indicate any significant changes. In other words, our agent could 
perform the tasks in a timely manner without producing any unexpected overhead.  
Based on the risk assessment approach introduced in Chapter 4.4.1, we have performed 
several experiments to determine how the weights from security administrators can affect 
our assessment results. The assessment considers at most 54 groups of vulnerability in a 
product found in a target system and each group is categorized by either exploitability or 
impact. The dataset is collected from XML files by jOVALdi tool. For instance, our tool 
checks vulnerability with a locally installed product in a target system and tested it again 
in vulnerability server with jOVALdi. In order to analyze results with given weights, we 
performed several experiments in a desktop computer (CPU 2.80GHz, 4.00GB RAM, 
Microsoft Windows 7 operating system).  
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(1) Assessment Result in Apache                     (2) Assessment Result in Firefox 
 
                                             (3) Assessment Result in Safari 
Figure 31: Assessment Results 
Figure 31 illustrates the analysis results based on the different viewpoints from security 
administrator. All CPE values set to 1 because we mainly concentrate on changes in 
CVSS score based on given weights from security administrator. Figure 3 (1) shows that 
Apache product has vulnerabilities in the system but the most critical vulnerability in the 
system has been changed depending on the value of  exploitability and impact. For 
example, the significant vulnerability was changed after setting up the exploitability 
impact to 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.  We could obtain similar results in Mozilla Firefox 
and Apple Safari products. In addition, the result shows that these weights not only 
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change the most significant vulnerability but also affect the ranking of vulnerabilities. As 
a matter of fact, none of critical vulnerability is affected.  
 
       (1) Assessment Results in Adobe Reader    (2) Assessment Results in Windows  
Figure 32: Assessment Results (Less Change) 
We have observed that some experiments show almost constant results under different 
weights. Figure 32 illustrates both products were not affected by weights from security 
administrator. However, CPE factors such as operating system, application, and 
hardware, could change the significant vulnerability and ranking of vulnerability 
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6 CONCLUSION  
In this thesis, we have proposed an innovative security assessment system that is 
designed to facilitate not only event–driven continuous monitoring, but also automated 
risk assessment accommodating various environmental requirements. Event-driven 
continuous monitoring system is capable of monitoring suspicious events, which could 
lead security risks based on security standards in OVAL. Also, the proposed system can 
be easily adapted to various environments in a seamless manner. In addition to the event-
driven continuous monitoring, we have also introduced the tool that can provide and 
expand vulnerability information with high-level reasoning and decision-making.  Our 
experiments demonstrated we could accomplish the comprehensive security risk 
assessment based on security administrator’s view point. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTION 
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1. We articulated the need for event-driven continuous monitoring including 
identified challenges and design criteria in building corresponding security 
assessment systems. 
2. We proposed systematic approaches to realize event-driven continuous 
monitoring framework that automatically assesses vulnerabilities and calculate 
risk scores based on multiple viewpoints from security administrators.  
3. We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype based on our event-driven 
continuous monitoring framework. We evaluated our system with various use 
cases for each component and our results showed an event-driven continuous 
 69 
 
monitoring system could analyze vulnerable configurations and calculate risk 
scores in a seamless and timely manner.  
6.2 FUTURE WORK 
Our future work includes the refinement and extensions of the event-driven continuous 
monitoring framework. The current approach cannot perform continuous monitoring for 
the registry events after the reinstallation of product followed by the uninstallation. This 
problem is attributed by one of followings: inability to create trace logs, stopped agent, 
and data corruption [30]. The inability to create trace logs is the main reason that 
subscriber of events cannot receive the event notification from the provider. We will 
further study to overcome this issue so that we can even detect any changes in system 
configurations caused by the uninstallation of products. In addition, our system is focused 
on Microsoft Windows operating systems. However, we can extend the system to support 
the different operating systems or environments in a seamless manner. We plan to extend 
our approach to support various environments based on CIM-based approach.  In addition, 
we will investigate a more efficient and effective way to enhance an ontology-based 
security assessment including streaming reasoning and robust knowledge base for 
vulnerabilities. 
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APPENDIX 
 AGENT 
 
1) ID and password to get information of both system and configuration 
2) Agent console displaying the specific procedure for checking 
configuration of the machine 
 
 Vulnerability Server 
o User and Agent Panel 
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1) OVAL Server IP for agent connection 
2) IP range to search agent installed system 
3) Information table displaying target system information  
o Result Report Panel 
 
1) Reported result classified by IP address of the target system 
2) Report display by double click 
o Assessment Panel 
 
1) Username for IP address of the target system 
2) Date and time for each document as XML file format 
3) Detailed information of document for each file 
4) Graphical analysis for selected document 
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o Analysis Panel 
 
1) Target system selection for analysis 
2) Given weights from security administrator 
3) Analysis result based on gathered information 
o XML Parser Panel 
 
1) Pre-processing OVAL XML file to parse XML file into each definition 
 
 
 76 
 
 OVAL Ontology Server  
o Log Panel 
 
1) Log console for describing connections with target computers when server 
is started 
 
o Activity Panel 
 
1) Stored security standards displayed in Stored Configuration table 
2) Analyzed configuration table shows newly analyzed OVAL XML file 
definition 
3) Newly added definitions displayed in the bottom table 
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o History Panel 
 
1) Server start / stop history displayed 
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APPENDIX: 
 AGENT 
The agent monitors and captures suspicious events from the target system 
based on the given ID and Password. The Table shows detected 
vulnerability of test ids as yellow and definition ids as red. And the 
Console displays the processing procedure of agent tool. 
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 Vulnerability Server 
o User and Agent Panel 
Through the User and Agent Panel, administrator can set up the OVAL 
Ontology server IP to provide an address to the agent installed in the target 
computer. Server can trace agent tool over the network by given IP range 
and display detected agent in IP range. 
 
o Result Report Panel 
Result report panel displays detected vulnerabilities in the target system 
with its detection time. When a security administrator double clicks each 
attribute, the reported result of detected vulnerability will be provided. 
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o Assessment Panel 
The assessment panel gives graphical analysis of each document 
containing results of the detected vulnerability in the target system. Table 
shows vulnerabilities occurred in the target system and graph reflects 
vulnerability result of each document. 
 
o Analysis Panel 
Based on given IP address, the server collects information which are the 
detected vulnerabilities in the target system. It calculates priority of the 
vulnerabilities by the given weights from security administrator at the 
table. 
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o XML Parser Panel 
The server parses and splits each vulnerability definition based on OVAL 
XML file in given path. This pre-processing helps performance of 
vulnerability server to verify existing vulnerability in the target system. If 
the definition already exists in the specific path, it will show id column 
with gray color background. 
 
 
 OVAL Ontology Server  
o Log Panel 
Logs reveal when and which agent tool requested the vulnerability 
information in the network.  
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o Activity Panel 
The parsed definitions from OVAL XML file are stored in the database. 
‘stored configurations’ tab shows stored information. Newly analyzed 
information based on give path of OVAL XML file is displayed in 
analyzed configuration and definitions which are not stored in the database 
are visible in the bottom table. 
 
o History Panel 
Log History table logs the server start / stop by security administrator. 
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